Abstract-Persistent Fault Analysis (PFA) was introduced as a new approach to attack block ciphers at CHES 2018. Since then, it has been proven to be a powerful attack with an easy to achieve fault model which relies on the persistent alternation of constants e.g. S-Boxes. One of the main benefits, when working with PFA, comes from the perspective of an attacker: there is no need to conduct fault injections at runtime. As authenticated encryption is gaining more and more attraction from the research community e.g. the CAESAR competition, we opted to apply the principals of PFA to authenticated encryption schemes. Therefore, we decided to attack a subset of the AES based CAESAR finalists. In this work, we present a PFA of Deoxys-II, OCB and COLM. We show how to extend the original PFA to fit the needs of authenticated encryption schemes and what makes them vulnerable to PFA. Finally, we demonstrate the efficiency of the attacks by means of simulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fault attacks span a class of implementation level attack which were first introduced by Boneh et al. in 2000 [3] . Fault attacks pose a serious threat to the implementation of cryptographic algorithms, as they might break a whole cryptographic system with only one faulted encryption [11, 13, 1] , even though the underlying mathematical problem is proven to be secure. The most common type of fault attack is the Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) which requires knowledge of multiple faulted encryptions and a correct one. In contrast to the classical DFA, Persistent Fault Analysis (PFA), as introduced by Zhang et al. in [12] , only requires a fault injection with a persistent effect i.e. the fault is present at runtime. As a result of having a persistent fault, it is not necessary to perform fault injections at runtime. State of the art: So far, PFA was only applied on AES-128 by Zhang et al. [12] . They were also able to successfully attack a fault hardened implementation based on the Dual Modular Redundancy (DMR) countermeasure, which is a common countermeasure against fault attack. Contributions: We present the first PFA on the CAESAR finalists COLM, Deoxys-II, and OCB, which use AES or derivatives. Additionally, we verify the efficiency of our attacks by means of simulation. Organization: The rest of the work is structured as follows: Section II introduces authenticated encryption and the CAESAR competition. Section III introduces the principles of PFA. Section IV introduces the CAESAR finalist COLM and the application of the PFA. Section V introduces the CAESAR finalist Deoxys-II and the application of the PFA. Section VI introduces the CAESAR finalist OCB and the application of the PFA. Section VIII provides a conclusion of the conducted attacks on the CAESAR finalist.
II. AUTHENTICATED ENCRYPTION
Today's communication protocols do not only require confidentiality, but also authenticity. This can be achieved by combining an encryption scheme with a message authentication code (MAC). Authenticated encryption (AE) combines these traditionally separated functionalities into one single algorithm. Additionally, authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) can process associated data (AD), that needs to be authenticated, but must not be encrypted; e.g. header information in a network protocol. Fig. 1 shows the inputs and the outputs of an AEAD scheme (encryption), which will be introduced in the following: Formally, let k, ν, t ≥ 1,
t an authentication tag, and C ∈ {0, 1} * a ciphertext. An AEAD is a triple Π = (K, E, D), with a keygeneration procedure K that returns a random K, an encryption algorithm E K (N, AD, M ), and a decryption algorithm D K (N, AD, C, T ), where E outputs a pair (C, T ), and D outputs either the plaintext M or the void symbol ⊥ if the tag is invalid:
Figure 1: Authentication encryption with associated data
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recommends AES-GCM for AEAD [6] . However, in recent years, there were some doubts about the security and ease of side-channel resistant implementations of AES-GCM. Thus, the Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness (CAESAR), was announced in 2013. Its goal was to "identify a portfolio of authenticated ciphers that (1) offer advantages over AES-GCM and (2) are suitable for widespread adoption" [4] . In three rounds, the number of candidates was narrowed down from over 50 submissions to six finalists; optimized for three use cases: Ascon and ACORN for light-weight applications, AEGIS-128 and OCB for high-speed applications, and Deoxys-II and COLM for applications that require additional resistance against nonce misuse scenarios. With the announcement of the finalists in February 2019, CAESAR provides the most recent, well tested ciphers for authenticated encryption with associated data. Amongst these finalists, AEGIS, COLM, Deoxys-II, and OCB share the same permutation P = MC • SR • SB as AES.
III. PERSISTENT FAULT ANALYSIS
In contrast to the usual fault attack scenario where each run of a cryptographic function (e.g. each encryption) requires a fault injection, for PFA, it is sufficient to inject a single, persistent fault. While differential fault attacks alter a computed, intermediate value, persistent fault attacks alter a (stored) constant e.g. a S-Box value is altered. This has the advantage of not requiring multiple fault injections during runtime, but only one during the generation of the constant. Thus, the fault can be injected at any point in time between compilation/synthesis and the actual attack. Fig. 2 shows the simplified substitution layer (the linear layer is omitted) of an SPN-based cipher. The input of the b-bit wide S-Box S is x j i.e. the j th word . Furthermore, the distribution probability of the S-Box's output and the ciphertext is denoted by P (y j ) and P (c j ), respectively. For a well-designed cipher we can assume:
If one element of the S-Box is faulted, e.g. S[0], the former correct value
Thus, the probability P (y j = v) is zero, and the probability P (
. All other values y j still have the same probability P (y j ) = 2 −b = 1 256 . Since the key k j is fixed, the distribution of y j and c j are related, which is expressed in Eq. (1) .
Let t ∈ [0, (2 b − 1)] denote each possible value of c j . Then, the value of t occurring least and most are denoted t min and t max , respectively. There are three attack strategies: 1) As t min can be determined and the original value of the S-Box v is known, the key can be extracted with the following equation:
2) The values of t = t min can be used to eliminate impossible key candidates, under the assumption v is known:
3) If v * is known, t max can be used to determine k j :
The first and the second strategy are analytical approaches. In contrast, strategy three is a statistical approach, which requires enough faulty ciphertexts to ensure t max approaches 2 b−1 . must be noted, that all strategies require the structure depicted in Fig. 2 for the last round. Additionally, we assume the SBox is implemented as a table lookup. If there is an additional permutation layer in the last round, appropriate measures must be taken to counteract the effect of the permutation layer [7] . In summary PFA is able to extract the round key k which is added right after the substitution layer (during the last round), as shown in Fig. 2 . In the following section, we will demonstrate how to transform the PFAs for COLM, Deosys-II and OCB to the one published by Zhang et al. If the addition of the key is followed by the addition of a variable, PFA is only able to recover the sum of the variable and the key, we denote this by R. However, we will show how to post-process R to reveal the actual key.
IV. COLM
COLM was introduced by Andreeva et al. in 2016 [2] . It is an encrypt-linear-mix-encrypt mode of AES. There are two variants of COLM: COLM 127 primarily designed as a highspeed cipher, and COLM 0 primarily designed as a defense in depth cipher. As COLM was selected to be part of the final CAESAR portfolio as a defense in depth cipher, we focus on COLM 0 and further simply refer to it as COLM. However, the attack can also be mounted on COLM 127 . Operations in COLM are performed in GF (2 n ). Addition is thereby achieved by bitwise XOR which is denoted by +.
Multiplication of two polynomials
The result of the polynomial multiplication is reduced with reduction polynomial
A. Structure
The encryption of COLM is shown in Fig. 4 . E K denotes the AES encryption of a 128 bit data block with a 128 bit key K. The initialization vector IV is calculated as the sum of all AD blocks, where every AD block is first added to a multiple of a mask and then encrypted with E K . However, the concrete value is not needed for the attack. The masks involved in the encryption process are defined as
The linear mixing function ρ transforms x and st to y and st as shown in Eq. (5) .
During the encryption the following steps are performed for each message block M i where i ∈ [1, l−1]: First, a mask 2 i ·L is added to each message block M i . Then, an AES-encryption E K with key K is performed on the result. Afterwards, the linear mixing function ρ is applied, and another AESencryption is performed. Finally, the output mask 2 i · L 2 is added. The padded encryption and masking of the last message block is not relevant to the PFA and thus not described in this work.
B. PFA on COLM
As COLM is using AES as the underlying block-cipher, the principles of PFA can be applied. Our attack targets the encryption stage of COLM. Since COLM adds a mask to the output of AES, the PFA is only able to extract the sum of the last round key k and the current mask 2 i · L 2 . This sum is denoted by R i as shown in Eq. (6)
To overcome this problem two different values of R i are required:
, where x = y and x, y ∈ [1, m + 1]. The addition of these two values leads to Eq. (7), which can be solved for L 2 as shown in Eq. (8), as additions + and multiplications · are distributive in GF (2 n ).
As L 2 is known, the last round key k can be calculated as shown in Eq. (9) .
Finally, the inverted key schedule of AES is used to calculated the master key K.
Example:
We use the first and second message block to obtain the key: First, the mask L 2 is calculated as shown in Eqs. (10) and (11)
Next, the multiplicative inverse 6 −1 in GF ( 2 128 ) is calculated. Finally, the last round key of E K can be computed as shown in Eq. (12) .
The PFA attack, which was applied to COLM 0 , can also be applied to COLM 127 with minor modifications, during the processing of the masks.
V. DEOXYS-II
Deoxys-II is a two pass, nonce misuse resistant, tweakable AEAD scheme proposed by Jean et al. [9] it provides 128 bit security with respect to both privacy and authenticity. The attack we present on Deoxys-II only applies to Deoxys-II-128-128, which has a key and tweak size of 128 bit and uses the underlying block cipher Deoxys-BC-256. For the rest of this work we simply refer to them as Deoxys-II and Deoxys-BC.
A. Structure 
In the first pass of Deoxys-II the authentication is performed. In the second pass the generated authentication tag is then used for encryption. Tag Generation: Fig. 6 shows the tag generation. E T K denotes an encryption using Deoxsys-BC with key K and tweak T . The function int() returns the input as a unsigned integer representation i.e. a bit string. First, each message block M i , i ∈ [1, l] is encrypted with key K and tweak T = 0000||int(i). Then, all encrypted blocks are added together. We omit the authentication of the AD, as it only adds the additional value Auth to the XOR-tree. Finally, the result is encrypted once more with the nonce being part of the tweak. The output of the encryption is the tag.
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Figure 6: Deoxys-II Tag Genration
Message Encryption: Fig. 7 shows the encryption. In contrast to the authentication not the message blocks are encrypted using E T K , but a zero-padded nonce is encrypted. While the key K stays the same for all blocks, the tweak T depends on the previously generated tag and the current block number i ∈ [1, l] . The so encrypted nonce is then added to the message block M i to generate the cipher block C i . This leads to Eq. (15).
... 
B. PFA
In the following section we will outline how to apply PFA on either the generation of the tag or the message encryption. Preliminaries: In order to mount a PFA successfully, it is necessary to have access to the substitution layer's output i.e. the S-Box, as described by the Zhang et al. [12] . This is not the case in Deoxys-II, as it performs an additional ATK with ST K 14 after the last round function f 13 for key whitening.
To overcome this problem, it is necessary to apply minor modifications to the PFA: Fig. 8 shows the last steps of the Deoxys-BC. As it can be seen, they do not match the steps in Fig. 2 . Therefore, we swap SR and SB notional, such that f = MB•SB•SR•AT K. As both functions only operate on bytes, f is equivalent to f . Still, the output of the substitution layer of Deoxys-BC is not directly accessible, because the linear MB operation is not omitted in the last round, like the MixColumns operation is in AES. As MB and AT K are linear functions with respect to GF (2), the order of execution can also be swapped notional [7] . Now, the structure is essentially the same as shown in Fig. 2 
This is also visualized in Fig. 8 : the green colored values are known, the yellow values are under attack.
ST K14
Figure 8: PFA on the last round of Deoxys-BC-256.
There are two possible targets in Deoxys-II to mount a PFA: either the tag generation or the message encryption. Attack on the Message Encryption: As depicted in Fig. 7 , each message block can be encrypted separately. Thus, a PFA can be mounted on any block, as long as tag, M i and C i are known. In order to access the output of the encryption E K T , it is necessary to add the message block M i to the corresponding cipher block C i . Thus, in contrast to the original PFA, the PFA on Deoxys-II is not a ciphertext only attack, as it requires a ciphertext-plaintext pair. After mounting a PFA, that takes the effects of MB in the last round into account, the key K 0 can be recalculated by applying the inverted h and LF SR 2 functions 14 times. Attack on the Tag Generation: Alternatively, the last encryption E T K , of the tag generation, marked in yellow in Fig. 6 can be attacked. It calculates the tag as shown in Eq. (17).
In this case an attacker only requires knowledge about the Nonce and the tag in order to mount the PFA. Thus, making the PFA on Deoxys-II an tag-only attack again.
VI. OCB
OCB is a mode of operation for AES specified by Krovetz and Rogaway [10] . For the rest of this work we refer to the version of OCB which uses AES with a key length of 128 bit simply by OCB.
A. Structure
The Structure of OCB can be decomposed into two building blocks: the authentication of the AD and the message encryption. Message Authentication: Fig. 9 shows the tag generation. The associated data is authenticated by a HASH function that returns either the hash over the AD, or the zero string 0 128 for empty AD. The message is authenticated by a standard AES encryption E K : First, all (padded) message blocks are xored to form the Checksum. Then, two additional masks (Offset l and L $ ) are added. Next, the result is encrypted by a standard AES encryption E K . Finally, both outputs are xored again to form the tag. Message Encryption: Fig. 10 shows the encryption of both complete and partial message blocks. The encryption of a complete message block M i is based on the addition of a mask Offset i prior to the application of E K . After the encryption of the message block with E K , the same mask Offset i is added again to the intermediate result which then forms the ciphertext. The encryption of a partial message block M * differs significantly: For an partial message block, the ciphertext C * is calculated as the addition of the last plaintext block P * with the encrypted mask Offset * using E K .
Complete last block i
Incomplete last block i
Figure 10: OCB Message Encryption
B. PFA
The PFA can be applied either to the encryption of the last incomplete message block or on the calculation of the tag, when no associated data is used. Both attacks reduce the attack to the standard PFA on AES, which is a ciphertext only attack [12] . Thus, the input of E K is not needed for the attack.
Attack on the message encryption: Similar to the attack proposed by Dobraunig et al. [5] , we also attack the encryption of the last incomplete message block. As no mask is used for an incomplete message block, it provides a convenient attack target. The processing of the last message block M * is shown in Fig. 11 . 
By choosing a large last block, the brute force effort can be minimized. During our simulations we assumed bitlen(P * ) = 120, therefore 256 key candidates remain. Attack on the tag generation: The PFA can also be applied to the tag generation, if no AD is processed by OCB. An empty AD results in adding 0 128 to the result of an AES encryption E K in the last step of the tag generation. Therefore, E K can be attacked with the standard PFA.
VII. RESULTS
In the following section we will discuss the results of applying PFA on Deoxys-II, OCB and COLM. We verified the efficiency of the attacks by means of simulation. Due to the reason that Deoxys-II, OCB and COLM use AES or a slightly modified version of AES as underlying block cipher, the results are similar to the results provided by Zhang et al.
[1, ..., bitlen(P * )] Figure 11 : PFA on OCB's last incomplete message block [12] . The biggest challenge during the application of PFA to AEAD schemes is to map the prerequisites of PFA onto the AEAD scheme under attack. Table I shows which versions of Deoxys-II, OCB and COLM are vulnerable to PFA. As our simulations at the example of Deoxys-II, for simplicity reasons we used the so called "Strategy I" where t min is exploited [12] , under the assumption of a single perturbed SBox entry. Fig. 12 shows the average (1000 attacks) number of candidates for one key byte, for a PFA applied to the tag generation of Deoxys-II. As one can see in Fig. 12 approximately 1600 faulty tags are required on average to reveal the correct (N K = 1) key byte, also it becomes clear that there is barely a difference between the average of 1000 attacks and one particular attack. When attacking the underlying encryption scheme, which usually processes more than one message block, we can extract more information about the key per authenticated encryption compared to an attack on the tag. As an example if ten messages blocks are processed per authenticated encryption, only a tenth of the number of faulty tags i.e. 160 is required to determine the correct key byte. This is shown in Fig. 13 . The results of our Table III where one can see the average number of required encryptions or tag generations n avg , with respect to the attack strategy. In order to compare the attack on the tag generation with the attack on the encryption (which usually encrypts more than one message block) we encrypted only a single block of data i.e. 128 bit per authenticated encryption.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The fact that PFA can be applied to AEAD schemes should be considered a threat. This is mainly due to the fact that the fault model assumed by PFA is rather simple to achieve i.e. a faulted constant which is processed during a cryptographic operation. Especially when we consider resource constraint devices where it may be necessary to generate S-Boxes dynamically instead of a lookup table. Furthermore, one of the main benefits when working with PFA is the fact that no fault injections are required at runtime, which again reflects the persistent nature of the fault model introduced by the authors of [12] .
